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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
EQUITY-PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS-COURT WILL ORDER
ADMISSION OF QUALIFIED PHYSICIAN TO COUNTY
MEDICAL SOCIETY.
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y (N.J. 1961).
Plaintiff brought an action in lieu of mandamus to compel defendant
medical society to admit him to membership. The trial court found that
plaintiff had received a full medical education and had been awarded
the degree of Doctor of Osteopathy by the Philadelphia College of
Osteopathy, an institution not approved as a medical school by the
American Medical Association. After passing the requisite examination,
he had been licensed to practice medicine and surgery in New Jersey by
the State Board of Medical Examiners.1 Subsequently, on the basis of his
prior training and of seven months attendance, he received the degree of
Doctor of Medicine and Surgery from the College of Medicine of the
University of Milan, a medical school recognized by the American Medical
Association. Plaintiff had served a medical internship and a brief surgical
residency and consistently practiced medicine and surgery rather than
osteopathy. Although he fulfilled all the formal requirements for mem-
bership in defendant society, plaintiff's application for admission was re-
fused on the basis of an unwritten membership requirement of four years
of study at a medical school approved by the American Medical Asso-
ciation. As a result of this refusal, plaintiff was dropped from the staffs
of two hospitals which required their staff physicians to be members of
the defendant society, and was effectively precluded from access to the
facilities of other local hospitals, all of which had a similar requirement.
It consequently became impossible for plaintiff to practice his profession.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court directed that plaintiff be
admitted to full membership in the defendant Society.2 The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that public policy requires the courts
to strike down unreasonable and arbitrary exclusions from private asso-
ciations when such associations effectively control access to the practice of
a profession or vocation. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y,
170 A. 2d 791 (N.J. 1961).
Cases involving judicial interference with the membership policies
of unincorporated, non-profit organizations are of two types, those in-
volving exclusion of potential members and those involving expulsion of
individuals who had been members. The earlier English cases in this
field were of the expulsion type. In deciding these cases, Chancery re-
quired that the ex-member show that he was being deprived of some
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-5.1, 45:9-15 (1957).
2. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A. 2d
324 (1960).
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?roperty interest before it would enjoin the expulsion.8 In later decisions,
injunctive relief was granted on a contract theory, 4 and some commentators
have suggested that a tort theory5 might also be employed by an expelled
member as the basis for his re-instatement action. Aside from using these
traditional theories, courts have on occasion set aside the expulsion as
being unreasonable, contrary to natural justice, or violative of public
policy.6 In Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n,7 plaintiff
was expelled from defendant medical association because he had acted in
violation of a by-law of that association which provided for the expulsion
of any member who gave testimony in court disparaging another member.
In deciding that the expulsion was unreasonable and ordering plaintiff's
re-instatement, the court noted that a private association's by-law which
is found to be against public policy is unenforceable and furnishes no basis
for an expulsion. A somewhat similar position was taken much earlier
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court s when it affirmed a lower court's
order reinstating a union member who had been expelled for political
activities in violation of a by-law of the union which was determined by
the court to be against public policy and hence void. A transition can be
seen therefore in these expulsion cases, wherein the courts have moved
from judicial interference based on traditional theories to interference
based on the requirements of public policy.
Unlike the expulsion cases, the cases involving exclusion from mem-
bership are much less numerous and do not have any foundation in
traditional theories of property, contract, or tort (although it is at least
arguable that an interference with advantageous business relationships
could be found in some of these cases). However, in both cases the
essential evil involved is the economic harm which the individual may
suffer as a result of non-membership. In the exclusion cases there has
been a notable reluctance on the part of the courts to act, and this re-
luctance has evidently been due to the fact that none of the conventional
theories would justify such action. 9 Nevertheless, in particular situations,
3. Baird v. Wells, 44 Ch. D. 661 (1890); Wolfe v. Matthews, 21 Ch. D. 194(1882) ; Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482 (1880). The property interest required in
these cases was some interest in the physical assets of the organization.
4. Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc. Rep. 601, 122 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910);
Lawson v. Hewel, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897). The theory was that the
individual's entry into membership gave rise to a contract, and an expulsion without
good cause was a breach which the courts would enjoin.
5. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HARV. L.
Rzv. 993, 1007 (1930). The tort theory suggested is an action to prevent inter-
ference with an advantageous relationship. As yet, however, no court has acted
on this suggestion.
6. Joseph v. Passaic Hospital Ass'n, 26 N.J. 557, 141 A. 2d 18 (1958); Cox,
The Role of Law In Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Htav. L. Rzv. 609, 613 (1959).
7. 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P. 2d 862 (1956).
8. Spayd v. Lodge 665, Bhd. of Railroad Trainmen, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70
(1921).
9. Gold Knob Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Outdoor Advertising Ass'n of Texas,
Inc., 225 S.W. 2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); State ex rel. Baumhoff v. Tax-
payer's League of St. Louis County, 87 S.W. 2d 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935); Ross
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where considerations of policy and justice were sufficiently compelling,
judicial ingenuity has not been lacking.'0 In deciding these cases, a
distinction has been drawn between organizations of an economic nature,
in which membership is required before a particular career can be
pursued, and those of a purely social or fraternal nature." Courts applying
this distinction will act only in cases involving exclusion from an organiza-
tion of the former type, since exclusion from a social or fraternal
organization will usually result only in hurt feelings, while exclusion from
an economic one can result in loss of livelihood.' 2 Although comparatively
rare, there are cases involving unions' s and medical societies' 4 in which
the economic nature of the society was recognized and an unreasonable
exclusion therefrom enjoined by the court. Such a case was Group Health
Co-operative v. King County Medical Soc'y,15 in which plaintiffs, who
otherwise qualified for membership in a medical society, were excluded
therefrom on the ground that they practiced contract medicine in a
pre-paid medical co-operative. In ordering the society to admit plaintiffs,
the court held that the exclusion was unreasonable, arbitrary, and in
violation of the policy announced in the anti-monopoly provisions of the
State's constitution. A somewhat similar position was taken in Wilson v.
Newspaper Union.'6 In that case, plaintiffs were denied membership in a
union which had a closed shop agreement with the company, the union
simply stating it was closed to new members because many union members
were unemployed. The court, in ordering plaintiffs admitted, suggested
that when a union has a virtual monopoly over the practice of a trade
in an area, it is under a public duty not to exercise its power in an
unreasonable or arbitrary manner but to protect the individual's right to
earn a livelihood. Medical societies, although in theory purely private
groups, stand in a similar position in that a denial of membership is for
all practical purposes an effective revocation of license to practice 7 and
courts have recognized this in ordering medical societies to admit other-
wise qualified individuals who were arbitrarily excluded.' 8
v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W. 2d 315 (1957); Chafee, The Internal Affairs ofAssociations Not For Profit, 43 HAzv. L. Riv. 993, 1027 (1930).
10. Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 118
N.J. Eq. 11, 176 Ati. 692 (1935); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155
P. 2d. 329 (1944).
11. Trautwein v. Horbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A. 2d 30 (App. Div. 1956).
12. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HAzV. L.
Rxv. 993, 1022 (1930).
13. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944); Williams
v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P. 2d 903 (1946).
14. Group Health Co-operative v. King County Medical Society, 39 Wash. 2d 586.
237 P. 2d 737 (1951); People ex rel. Bartlett v. Medical Society, 32 N.Y. 187(Ct. App. 1865).
15. 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P. 2d 737 (1951).
16. 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (1938).
17. Note, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in
Organized Medicine, 63 YAL L.J. 938, 953 (1954).
18. See note 14 sutra.
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From the foregoing, it will be apparent that the New Jersey Supreme
Court has not acted as radically as it might at first appear. The cases
reveal that the courts in practice have found means to enjoin arbitrary
and unreasonable exclusions from private associations when such exclusions
resulted in serious economic harm to the excluded party. The fact
findings of the trial court clearly place the instant case in that category.
The great value of the present decision is that it articulates the public
policy considerations which have been the basis of many prior decisions,
but which have rarely been so explicitly recognized. 19 Public policy, as the
court recognizes, demands both that the right of the individual to practice
his profession be protected and that society not be denied the services of
qualified physicians. Applying this principle, the court has realistically
recognized that a "private" medical association may be in fact a "quasi-
public" °20 licensing body, completely controlling access to the practice of
medicine in a given area. An organization exercising such coercive eco-
nomic power can hardly be said to be genuinely "voluntary" in nature.
Further, the element of close personal associations within the organization,
which made the courts understandably reluctant to intervene in the
affairs of purely social and fraternal groups, is almost wholly lacking in
the case of such economic organizations. The court's choice then was
between leaving such an organization free to inflict grave economic harm
on individuals at will, or imposing a degree of judicial control. It wisely
chose the latter course. It would seem that this is clearly not an unrea-
sonable interference in the affairs of a private association as long as two
essential conditions are satisfied: (1) that the association monopolizes
the practice of a particular trade or profession, and (2) that the exclusion
complained of is genuinely arbitrary and unreasonable. The latter condi-
tion raises interesting possibilities of future litigation, particularly in view
of the continuing hostility of the organized medical profession to
osteopathy.21 How arbitrary must an exclusion be to justify judicial interven-
tion? It is interesting to speculate whether a New Jersey court would
now enjoin the exclusion from a medical society of one licensed to prac-
tice medicine but holding only a degree of Doctor of Osteopathy.
In this regard, the scope of the present decision is by no means clear, and
future litigation will undoubtedly be required to explore its implications.
Robert J. Jackson
19. That considerations of social policy play a vital formative role in the
evolution of law is hardly a novel proposition. See HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 35(1881). This has been widely recognized by the courts. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J.
353, 157 A. 2d 497 (1960).
20. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc' 170 A. 2d 791, 797 (1961),
quoting James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 151. 2d 329, 335 (1944).
21. Note, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics
in Organized Medicine, 63 YALic L.J. 938, 966-967 (1954).
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